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DACKMAN v.

DACKMAN

Divisible Divorce In Maryland -

Does It Exist?

Dackman v. Dackman'
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. North Carolina2 requiring that full faith and credit be accorded a foreign ex parte
divorce based on the domicile of one spouse, courts have been faced
with the question of the effect of valid ex parte divorce decrees on the
support rights of the resident wife. Applying what has been termed
the "unitary theory of divorce," Maryland courts have consistently
held that a wife's right to support does not survive a valid dissolution
of the marriage.3 Dackman v. Dackman4 indicated that in limited
circumstances a Maryland court could award support payments to an
ex-wife notwithstanding the existence of a valid foreign divorce decree.
The court of appeals' pronouncement in Dackman represents at least
an exception to the long standing Maryland rule and requires an
analysis of the prior law to determine the decision's full impact.
The parties were married in 1951 and lived together in Maryland
until November 1967 when defendant husband moved to Nevada. In
December 1967 plaintiff wife filed a bill in Maryland asking for permanent alimony, custody and child support, alleging defendant's adultery
and desertion as grounds. In January 1968 defendant filed suit for
divorce in Nevada and shortly thereafter was granted a divorce decree
which did not allow alimony but did provide child support.5 Defendant
had been personally served in Nevada prior to his institution of the
Nevada proceedings and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In March 1968 the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City overruled defendant's motion to dismiss, and from this ruling he appealed.6
The court of appeals held that the denial of a challenge to the
jurisdiction is a non-appealable order, and remanded without affirmance or reversal for further proceedings, indicating that it would affirm:
"[A] suitable decree granting the wife support payable only from
the property of her husband in Maryland if the wife cannot or does
not choose to impeach the Nevada decree and the trial judge finds it
factually appropriate to grant such a decree."
1. 252 Md. 331, 250 A.2d 60 (1969).
2. 317 U.S. 287 (1942). "[W]hen a court of one state acting in accord with
the requirements of procedural due process alters the marital status of one domiciled

in that state by granting him a divorce from his absent spouse, we cannot say its
decree should be excepted from the full faith and credit clause merely because its
enforcement or recognition in another state would conflict with the policy of the

latter." Id. at 303.
3. E.g., Upham v. Upham, 238 Md. 261, 208 A.2d 611 (1965); Brewster v.
Brewster, 204 Md. 501, 105 A.2d 232 (1954) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 202 Md. 547, 97
A.2d 330 (1953) ; Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 A. 605 (1936).
4. 252 Md. 331, 250 A.2d 60 (1969).
5. Mrs. Dackman was personally served in Maryland regarding the Nevada
divorce proceedings. She elected not to appear or plead in that action. Record Extract
to Appellant's Brief No. 48 at E. 24, Dackman v. Dackman, 252 Md. 331, 250 A.2d
60 (1969).
6. The defendant contended that he was not domiciled in Maryland, that the
Maryland "long arm" statute does not give in personam jurisdiction in alimony cases
and that the service of process in Nevada was defective. Brief for Appellant at 3,
10, Dackman v. Dackman, 252 Md. 331, 250 A.2d 60 (1969).
7. 252 Md. at 347, 250 A.2d at 68-69. This action by the court was taken under
Maryland Rule 871. It should be noted that the parties on this appeal were not con-

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXX

The trial court held that the husband was domiciled in Maryland
at the time he was served with process in Nevada, thus giving the
court in personam jurisdiction under the Maryland "long-arm" statute."
The court of appeals disagreed with this finding since the wife had not
impeached the finding of fact of the Nevada court that the husband
was domiciled in Nevada at the time he received service of process.
The court of appeals found jurisdiction to exist, however, in "[tflhe
inherent right and power of a court of equity to require the sequestration or attachment of property of a nonresident husband within its
jurisdiction as a source of support and maintenance to a legally and
factually deserving wife. .

.."9

Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Judge Hall Hammond
pointed out that the traditional rule in Maryland was that once a party
obtained a valid ex parte out-of-state divorce,10 the marital relationship no longer existed and a Maryland court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain a former wife's suit for alimony, since such liability could only
arise from, or be incident to, an existing marital relationship. Dackman
chose to relax this rule under the specific facts involved and allowed
Mrs. Dackman's claim even though it admitted that she could not sue
for divorce herself unless the Nevada decree was found defective."
There are generally three different approaches to the problem
presented in the Dackman litigation.1 2 The Supreme Court held in
Estin v. Estin'3 that although the full faith and credit clause of the
tending that an alimony action could or could not survive the Nevada decree. Once
the court ruled that there was jurisdiction over the husband, the issue on appeal was
decided and the rest of the opinion was in fact unsolicited by the parties.
8. MD.ANN. CODP art. 75, § 95 (1969).
9. 252 Md. at 346, 250 A.2d at 68. See Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243
U.S. 269 (1917). In addition to her bill for alimony, plaintiff wife also filed a petition
for an ex parte injunction to prevent defendant from removing property from the
state. The trial court issued the injunction, holding that Mo. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 4
(1966) authorized the seizure of property belonging to a nonresident defendant pursuant to a bill of complaint for permanent alimony. As the court of appeals noted,
this section of the code was not technically applicable, since by its terms it applies in
an action for divorce, not alimony without divorce. However, the court noted that
"[w]here the court cannot obtain jurisdiction in personam over the husband it may
award support, if the wife proves misconduct or behavior which would justify granting her a divorce, payable from property of the husband within the court's jurisdiction."
252 Md. at 345, 250 A.2d at 68. The court went on to say that this power of an
equity court to sequester property of a nonresident husband within its jurisdiction is
analogous to the statutory right granted in divorce cases by art. 16, § 4. Id. at 346,
250 A.2d at 68.
10. In Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), the Supreme Court
held that the state of North Carolina must give full faith and credit to ex parte
Nevada divorces in spite of the fact that the other spouse was not domiciled in Nevada,
was not personally served there and the divorce was granted for a ground not recognized as a cause for divorce in North Carolina. See note 2 supra. See also Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), which
indicate that all states must recognize an out-of-state ex parte divorce as far as the
dissolution of the marital relationship, assuming the foreign court had bona fide
jurisdiction over the complaining spouse.
11. The court pointed out that to prove the Nevada divorce decree defective the
wife would have to show that the husband did not have actual domicile in Nevada.
252 Md. at 336, 250 A.2d at 63.
12. Courts have in most cases allowed alimony rights to survive an ex parte
divorce. In most jurisdictions this is accomplished by statute. See note 16 infra. The
majority of remaining jurisdictions permit it by common law. See note 17 infra.
A minority of states have denied such survival. See note 18 infra.
13. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
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Constitution requires that a decree of absolute divorce from one state
be honored in any other,14 a local support order could survive a subsequent valid ex parte divorce if the state's law permitted such an action,
thus recognizing the divisible divorce. 5 A number of states have enacted appropriate statutes to comply with Estin8 while, absent statu17
tory provisions, a majority have allowed support rights to survive.
Maryland was one of the8 minority of states which had heretofore not
permitted such survival.'
The portent of Dackman can only be ascertained when read in
the light of its predecessors. Staub v. Staub19 was the first Maryland
case dealing with the problem. The parties were married in Baltimore
and resided there for about five months until they separated. The
wife subsequently established residence in Arkansas and obtained in a
court of that state an absolute divorce on the grounds of cruelty. Since
the husband did not appear in that action, the Arkansas court was
without authority to award alimony. In the following year the wife
filed suit in Maryland seeking permanent alimony and alimony pendente lite. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint
and the court of appeals affirmed, pointing out that although other
jurisdictions had decided that such an action could be maintained,
[it was] unable to conclude that the right to maintain a proceeding for alimony may survive the dissolution of the marriage
relation, since alimony is founded upon the common law obligation
of a husband to support his wife, which, in the absence of some
saving statute, must necessarily end by the passage of a decree
effectively dissolving the marriage tie ....
The court also said that since the plaintiff had severed that relationship voluntarily in another state, there was no reason to allow her
to prevail in such an action in Maryland since, if her allegations were
true, she could have sued defendant in Maryland and had the alimony
question adjudicated."
Johnson v. Johnson 2 was one of the leading cases in Maryland
prior to Dackman. In 1948 the wife obtained an a mensa divorce in
Maryland on the grounds of cruelty. The decree included an award
14. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
15. See Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARv. L. Rv. 1233 (1963).
16. See, e.g., ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1961); N.J. Rv. STAT. § 2A: 34-23
(1952); OxI.A. STAT. fit. 12, § 1284 (1961).
17. See, e.g., King v. King, 185 Kan. 742, 347 P.2d 381 (1959); Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 162 Ohio St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954), aff'd 350 U.S. 568 (1956);
Seely v. Seely, 348 P.2d 1064 (Okla. 1959).
18. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 202 Md. 547, 97 A.2d 330 (1953). See also Ingersall
v. Ingersall, 202 N.E.2d 820 (Mass. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. McCormack v.
McCormack, 164 Pa. Super. 553, 67 A.2d 603 (1949). For a thorough summary of

cases representing the three possible solutions to the foreign divorce problem, see
Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HaRv. L. Rzv. 1233, 1240 (1963); Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d
1378 (1953).
19. 170 Md. 202, 183 A. 605 (1936).
20. Id. at 212, 183 A. at 610.
21. Id.
22. 202 Md. 547, 97 A.2d 330 (1953).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXX

of alimony and child support.2" In January 1950 the husband obtained
an a vinculo divorce in Florida. The wife participated in that litigation and appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court which
affirmed without opinion.24 The wife did not seek alimony in the
Florida litigation but the Florida court decree provided that "nothing
in this decree shall be held or construed to relieve the plaintiff in any
manner from the support and maintenance provision" of the Maryland
decree. 5 In May 1951 the wife filed an amended petition in Maryland to increase the alimony award to provide funds to appeal the
Florida decision. The lower court granted the petition and the husband appealed. The court of appeals reversed, 26 holding that in spite
of the provision in the Florida decree, under Maryland law the court
had no power to act once the a vinculo divorce was granted. The
opinion cited Staub and held that a Maryland court had no authority
to make, change or enforce a provision for alimony payments by a
husband to his former wife unless that power was expressly or impliedly reserved by the court in its a vinculo decree. 2 The court also
commented that if Maryland law was to be changed to allow alimony
rights to survive the marital status, the change would have to come
from the legislature."8 In Staub and Johnson the factual situation was
decidedly different from that presented in Dackman. In Staub the
complaining wife was attempting to obtain alimony when she was the
one who had instituted the proceedings and obtained the foreign
divorce, and it could be argued she should not prevail on the basis
of an estoppel argument. In Johnson the complaining wife had answered the challenge of the foreign divorce proceeding and was a party
to the action which resulted in the final decree. The reasonine of the
court in not allowing a further alimony action where the wife has personally litigated the matter would appear logical. However, instead of
announcing a rule along such lines, the Maryland court issued the broad
statement that alimony cannot survive the marital relationship.
Brewster v. Brewster 9 presents another complicated set of facts.
In April 1950 the husband filed suit for divorce on the ground of
23. To insure payment of the alimony and child support decree, some shares of
stock belonging to the husband were paid to the court in January 1951.
24. Johnson v. Johnson, 49 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 941

(1952).

25. 202 Md. at 550, 97 A.2d at 331. It should be noted that the questions of res
judicata and full faith and credit which were issues in the Florida litigation were
not presented to the Maryland court. The further questions concerning contractual
relations between the husband and wife, although mentioned by the court, are beyond
the scope of this note.
26. Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Md. 329, 86 A.2d 520 (1952).
27. Id. at 338, 86 A.2d at 524. The court is saying that if it had granted the
a vinculo decree, then it would have retained jurisdiction. Their point was that a
Florida court cannot award jurisdiction to a Maryland court over a matter which is
denied jurisdiction by Maryland law.
28. Id. The husband subsequently filed a bill to have his court held stock released
to the extent that it represented alimony payments, claiming that he was no longer

liable under the Maryland a mensa decree in light of the Florida decree. The lower
court dismissed the bill, but the court of appeals reversed and ordered the stock
released, on the ground that the alimony provision of the Maryland a mensa decree
did not survive the dissolution of the marriage in Florida. 202 Md. at 552, 97 A.2d
at 332.
29. 204 Md. 501, 105 A.2d 232 (1954).
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voluntary separation, and the wife filed a cross bill for an a mensa
divorce on the ground of desertion. The proceedings were suspended
while counsel for both parties attempted to work out a property settlement. In February 1951 wife's counsel submitted a settlement proposal and husband's counsel requested that the cause be held in abeyance
since his client was out of town on business. The business trip happened to include a stay in Arkansas where, without the Maryland
counsel's knowledge, the husband filed for a divorce in May 1951.
The wife was served in Maryland by mail; she then informed the
Maryland court of these facts and it enjoined the husband from proceeding in Arkansas and from transferring any assets owned or controlled by him. On the same day the court granted the wife an
a nensa divorce, awarding $400 a month as alimony. This payment
was made without question until August 1953 although in July 1951
husband was granted an absolute divorce in Arkansas which did not
award any alimony. In June 1953 the husband filed a bill in Maryland
requesting a reduction in alimony. No action was taken until the
following fall when the wife petitioned for back alimony and sought
contempt proceedings against the husband. The lower court entered
judgment against the husband for $1600 notwithstanding the Arkansas
divorce and held him in contempt for failure to comply with its 1951
injunction. The court of appeals reversed, indicating that until the
Arkansas divorce was judicially impeached, 30 it was entitled to full
faith and credit and ended the right of a Maryland court to decree
alimony. The court cited Staub and Johnson as authority for the
proposition that Maryland is among those jurisdictions which hold
that the power to award or enforce alimony does not survive the marital
relationship. The case was remanded for proceedings to adjudicate the
validity of the foreign divorce decree.
Maryland has followed its decision in Brewster with Upham v.
Upham."' The husband moved to an apartment in Pennsylvania for
employment purposes while the wife remained in Maryland.

Eight

months thereafter the wife filed suit for alimony without divorce, but
failed to prosecute the action. A year and a day after moving to
Pennsylvania the husband filed suit for an absolute divorce. The wife
was served but did not answer or appear, and the Pennsylvania court
granted the husband a divorce. Shortly thereafter the wife filed 3 a2
petition in Pennsylvania to open the decree but the court dismissed.
She then petitioned a Maryland court for further payment of alimony
pendente lite and for counsel fees. The lower court found that the
husband was a bona fide resident of Pennsylvania, the divorce was
valid and that the husband had only to pay counsel fees for services
rendered up until the date of the divorce decree. The court of appeals
30. The wife urged that she had continually challenged the Arkansas divorce and
that the mere challenge was enough to stay its operations in Maryland. The court
held that the wife had the burden of proving that the Arkansas court had no jurisdiction, i.e., that her husband had not acquired a valid domicile in Arkansas and until
such burden was sustained the divorce was presumed valid and entitled to full faith
and credit in Maryland. Id. at 505, 105 A.2d at 234.
31. 238 Md. 261, 208 A.2d 611 (1965).
32. Upham v. Upham, 204 Pa. Super. 735, 203 A.2d 495 (1964).
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affirmed, and, citing Brewster, reiterated: "The rule in Maryland is
that after the dissolution of the marital relationship, whether by the
decree of this or another 3state,
the courts of this State are precluded
3
from awarding alimony.)

A foreign ex parte divorce can only be attacked on the ground
that the rendering court did not have jurisdiction - that the spouse
acquiring the divorce did not acquire a bona fide domicile in the rendering state and that the other spouse had no opportunity to litigate
the jurisdictional issue. 4 Thus, under the unitary theory of divorce
in Maryland, if such an attack is unsuccessful, all rights of a Maryland
court to grant or enforce an award of alimony are terminated as of
the date of the divorce.3 ' Dackman modifies this general rule in Maryland when certain facts are present, and, to this extent, recognizes
the theory of divisible divorce first announced in Estin v. Estin.
The court in Dackman carefully restricted its relaxation of the
existing rule in Maryland and indicated that it was appropriate to
exercise jurisdiction:
...in a case in which the marital domicile was in Maryland for
many years, the deserted wife continues to reside here, the adultery which is the fault which justifies support and maintenance assuming it is proven that it occurred - took place in Maryland,
there is ample property in Maryland to furnish the support, and
the foreign divorce was granted without the wife being personally
before the court. .

.

. [W]e at this time limit our decision and

holding to the particular facts of the case before us. ...

It is difficult to ascertain precisely to what extent the rule in Johnson
has been relaxed, 8 since the wife in Johnson vigorously participated
in the out-of-state litigation. In Staub the wife was the party who
obtained the foreign divorce by establishing residency in Arkansas,
and the holding in Dackman could hardly apply to that situation.
Judge Hammond joined in the court's decisions in Brewster and
Upham which were more analogous to Dackman, although in both
those cases there was no indication that the value of the husband's
property remaining in Maryland was significant nor was there the
strong marital offense of adultery. Perhaps had those elements been
present, the Maryland rule would have been "relaxed" sooner. However, it seems equally possible that Brewster and Upham are still
good law and would be followed in the future.3 9
33. 238 Md. at 265, 208 A.2d at 613.
34. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
35. Cf. Pelle v. Pelle, 229 Md. 160, 182 A.2d 37 (1962); Slansky v. State, 192
Md. 94, 63 A.2d 599 (1949).
36. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
37. 252 Md. at 346-47, 250 A.2d at 68.
38. In the course of the Dackman opinion Judge Hammond announced that since
the legislature had not responded to the request for legislative action in his concurring
opinion in Johnson, the rule set forth in Johnson should be relaxed. 252 Md. at
344-45, 250 A.2d at 67.
39. If the exact facts of Dackman must be present to relax the rule, then it would
seem to follow that Brewster and Upham still represent Maryland law.
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The first strong statement of dissatisfaction with the Maryland
rule was expressed by Judge Hammond in a concurring opinion in
Johnson. In that opinion it is pointed out that the Florida divorce
decree expressly provided that it did not relieve the husband of the
obligation of the Maryland support decree, and thus, even though the
wife did appear in the action, the decree rendered did not intend to
deny her the right to alimony. The opinion implies that had the Florida
court denied alimony and the wife had been present -then Maryland
would be precluded, by the rule of res judicata, from taking any further
action." The opinion cogently presents the inherent weakness of the
unitary theory of divorce:
Under the reasoning and holding of Staub v. Staub . . . if Mrs.

Johnson had ignored the Florida divorce proceedings and the
divorce had been granted ex parte, Maryland would have no
jurisdiction to give or continue alimony. In these days of Nevada,
Florida, Arkansas, and other prolific divorce States, this puts a

separated wife in a real predicament . . . having the alternative

of submitting to the jurisdiction of a foreign Court, where as an
out-of-state defendant, she is under a disadvantage in seeking
alimony, or of ignoring the foreign divorce proceeding and losing
the alimony granted by her home Court entirely. Under the mores
and practices of the times, it is hardly fair for Maryland to put its
lady citizens in this predicament because of a narrow, artificial and
unrealistic concept and judicial interpretation of alimony.4
While stating that the unitary theory of divorce should be changed,
based as it is on a definition of alimony which to say the least, is
restricted, Judge Hammond suggested that the required change in the
law should more appropriately be made by the legislature. 2
40. 202 Md. at 557, 97 A.2d at 277.
41. Id. at 558, 97 A2d at 278. Judge Hammond's quarrel with the term alimony is that the word was first used when the English Ecclesiastical Courts were
granting a mensa divorces. These divorces were not considered as severing the marital
relationship and the alimony provision arose from the common law duty to support a
wife even though they were living apart. When the a vinculo divorce was created by
statute in Maryland it provided for alimony patterned after the English version; thus,
once an a vinculo divorce had been granted without alimony, the common law obligation was destroyed (there no longer being a marital relationship) and alimony could
not be granted after such decree. Judge Hammond reasoned that the support award
in an absolute divorce decree cannot be defined as alimony in the traditional sense
since it provides for payments to be made after the marital relation is severed. He
also points out that if a court does not award alimony but merely reserves jurisdiction
to modify its support provision, it can at any time provide for payments in the future
and this would certainly be inconsistent with the traditional concept of alimony. See
also Lindey, Foreign Divorce: Where Do We Go From Here?, 17 U. Pier. L. Rtv.
125, 144 (1956), for another statement of the problem posed by Judge Hammond.
42.
[A] Court would have the power to require support of a former wife at
any time that the interests of justice and the parties required it, regardless of
whether the divorce decree had provided for alimony or had retained jurisdiction,
it would add flexibility where both parties are Maryland residents, or where, as
in the instant case, the wife and the property of the husband are in Maryland.
The result which could have been achieved and which I would have urged in the
present case, if the proposed change had been the law, would be far more fair and
just than the result which had to come under the present state of the law.
202 Md. at 561-62, 97 A.2d at 279.
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The change in the law was not forthcoming, however, and the
court of appeals continued to adhere to the general rule in Brewster
and Upham." The Dackman situation, however, was sufficiently shocking to jolt the court into a reassessment of the rule and to justify
the limited modification which resulted. The husband, an attorney,
was obviously well aware of the Maryland law which would allow
him to escape the burden of alimony. He was wealthy enough to be
able to go to Nevada and start a new life with no need ever to return
to Maryland. Also, he would probably not be financially burdened
by even a generous alimony award, and yet Mrs. Dackman under
Maryland law had no remedy. Additionally, the husband had committed what is considered the most grievous marital offense which
would have entitled the wife to an absolute divorce in Maryland had
she wanted one. The situation was just too much for a court steeped
in traditions of morality, religion, and the sanctity of marriage.
The court, in order to effect the desired change in Maryland law,
focused on the term alimony in its traditional sense" and redefined it
in terms of support.45 To accomplish this change the court turned to
its 1963 decision in Clayton v. Clayton.46 There the wife filed for
a divorce on the ground that at the time of their marriage the husband was already legally married to someone else. An absolute divorce
may be awarded for a cause which by the laws of Maryland render a
marriage null and void ab initio.4 7 Alimony was also awarded, and
the husband appealed, contending that if the marriage was void, then
a marital relationship had never existed and since alimony can only
arise incident to such a relationship, a court cannot award alimony
when it has judicially determined that there has been no marriage.
The appropriate Maryland divorce statute4 8 enlarged the powers of
an equity court to award absolute divorces and provided that in any
decree of divorce alimony may be granted. The court reasoned that
alimony had by statute been changed from its traditional definition49
to a term which in reality was "commensurate with 'support' "5 thus
indicating a legislative intent to permit alimony in a proper case even
though the underlying marriage is a nullity.5 1 The Dackman court

decided that the change in the technical meaning of the term alimony
was the answer to its problem.
The Legislature has not seen fit to respond to the suggestions
in the concurring opinion in the second Johnson case or to those
in Clayton and we now take the view that the rule of the Johnson
cases restating the earlier cases should be reexamined and relaxed, since in Clayton we did change the established concept
43. It is interesting to note that the lower courts in Brewster and Johnson seemed
more than willing to change the law since both those decisions were in favor of the wife.
44. See note 41 supra.
45. 252 Md. at 343, 250 A.2d at 67.
46. 231 Md. 74, 188 A.2d 550 (1963).
47. MD. ANN. CODS art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969).
48. MD. ANN. CoDm art. 16, §§ 2, 3 (1966).
49. See note 41 supra.
50. 231 Md. at 77, 188 A.2d at 552.
51. Id.
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of alimony in cases of absolute divorce by reading "alimony"
in § 3 of Art. 16 of the Code as commensurate with "support"
and allowable where there never was the legal relation of husband and wife and thereby changed the concept of statutory
alimony which underlay the rule of the Johnson cases and the
earlier cases on which they relied. 2
The court went on to say that a court of equity, independent of its
authority to grant a divorce, can grant alimony where the husband is
at fault and that if the court could not obtain in personam jurisdiction
over the ex-husband it could award support from his property within
the court's jurisdiction provided the wife could prove misconduct
which would be grounds for divorce.53 Under this reasoning and the
new rule regarding alimony the court held that Mrs. Dackman could
be awarded "support" from her ex-husband's property in Maryland.
The application of the new rule solely to the carefully outlined
situation in Dackman5 4 leaves many questions unanswered as to the
effect the decision will have on Maryland divorce law. Seemingly,
whenever one element of the Dackrnan situation is changed or missing, the court would be free to decide for itself whether to restrict or
extend the Dackman holding. Perhaps the court's narrow ruling is a
plea for the legislature to provide guidance for further situations.
To predict what effect Dackman may be expected to have, Estin
v. Estin55 requires closer scrutiny since Maryland seems to have
adopted, if only very narrowly, the concept of divisible divorce. In
Estin the wife was granted a decree of separation by a New York
court and an award of $180 per month as permanent alimony. The
husband subsequently went to Nevada, established domicile there, and
obtained an absolute divorce decree which made no provision for
alimony. The wife was served but did not appear or answer. When
the husband failed to make alimony payments, the wife brought an
action for arrears, and the New York courts granted judgment in her
favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while the Nevada
divorce decree was entitled to full faith and credit, it was not effective
as to the wife's support rights. The court phrased the question as
"whether Nevada could under any circumstances adjudicate rights of
respondent [wife] under the New York judgment when she was not
personally served or did not appear in the proceeding." 56 The court
reasoned that the New York judgment was a property interest created
by New York in a proceeding where both parties were present and
held that Nevada had no power to adjudicate the wife's rights thereto
and New York did not have to give full faith and credit to a court
having no jurisdiction. Thus the part of the Nevada judgment as to
support was not entitled to full faith and credit and could not alter
the wife's support rights under the New York judgment.57
52. 252 Md. at 344-45, 250 A.2d at 67.

53. Id. at 345, 250 A.2d at 67-68. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
54. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
55. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
56. Id. at 547.
57. Justice Jackson's dissent in Estin points out that under New York law if
the husband had attained a divorce in New York it would terminate the wife's right
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Estin left an obvious question of whether the fact that the wife's
claim had been reduced to judgment before the divorce was the controlling factor which allowed the decree to survive the divorce. Following
Estin, New York passed a statute which in substance stated that a
wife could maintain an action for maintenance even if a foreign divorce
had been granted as long as personal jurisdiction over the wife was
not obtained by the foreign court." In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt 9 this
statute was contested and upheld. The parties had been living in
California. They separated there in 1952, and in February 1953 the
wife moved to New York where she remained. In June 1953 the
husband obtained an absolute divorce in Nevada. In April 1954 the
wife filed suit for separation and alimony in New York, and that
court under the statute awarded her designated support payments. The
husband argued that the New York statute was unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court upheld the statute and answered the question left by
Estin as to whether the maintenance decree must precede the divorce:
In our opinion this difference is not material on the question
before us. Since the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction, the
Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish any right which
she had under the law of New York to financial support from her
husband. It has long been the constitutional rule that a court
cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.6 0
While answering this question directly, Vanderbilt raised another
which is pointed out in Justice Harlan's dissent. 6 His dispute with
the majority was not based on his opposition to divisible divorce, but
was rather based on his view that the majority was overbroad in its
holding. The opinion would limit the power of a state to refuse to
give full faith and credit to support decrees rendered ex parte by a
sister state where the wife was domiciled in the refusing state at the
time the ex parte decree was entered.62
Factually, Dackman lies between Estin and Vanderbilt. Mrs.
Dackman's claim for alimony had not been reduced to judgment
to alimony and that to give the Nevada decree full faith and credit it should have
the same effect a New York decree would have. Id. at 554.

58. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1170(b)

(1963).

(1920), superceded by N.Y. Crv. PRAc.

59. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
60. Id. at 418.

61. Id. at 428-35. Justice Frankfurter dissented also but his argument was that
the full faith and credit clause required New York to recognize the Nevada ruling
in its entirety.

62. The point of view of Justice Harlan in Vanderbilt would pose more of a
problem to the Maryland court. Mrs. Dackman was a domiciliary of Maryland at the
time of the divorce, but the court also gave weight to the fact that the marital domicile
was in Maryland and the marital offense occurred there. It is impossible from the
court's opinion to determine how important such elements are. What would the
court do, for example, if the marital domicile had been in Maryland the minimum
time for residency? It is difficult to imagine a court denying her relief on this ground
if the court felt that she would remain domiciled in Maryland even though the court
in Dackman placed reliance on Maryland being the situs of the marital domicile and
marital offense. For a more detailed discussion of the wife who moves away after
a divorce and establishes domicile in a state which would allow her to sue for support
after divorce, see Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HARV. L. Rzv. 1233, 1242 (1963).
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although it had been instituted. It is arguable that since she made
the claim before the divorce, it became somewhat of a legal property
right that could not be adjudicated by Nevada. This question is
really moot, however, since Vanderbilt held that it was immaterial
that the support action was instituted after the divorce decree became
final.6" In light of the court's reasoning in Dackman the concern for
the stay-at-home wife seems to be the overriding factor and, consistent
with Vanderbilt, the fact that a wife had not instituted a suit before
the divorce should not preclude her doing so afterward.
Still another problem arises when the wife obtains the foreign
ex parte divorce as in Staub v. Staub. 4 The Arkansas court in that
case did not have jurisdiction to award alimony, but the Maryland
court, after holding that alimony was not divisible from the divorce
action, also hinted at an estoppel argument. Since the wife had alleged
facts sufficient to procure a Maryland divorce but had chosen another
forum, the Maryland courts would not entertain a claim for alimony
after the judgment of the foreign court. 65 Although it is arguable
that Mrs. Staub never had the opportunity to litigate the question of
alimony and therefore she should not be prevented by some form of
res judicata, it is not difficult to foresee that Maryland, although it
has recognized divisible divorce to some extent, will not give the wife
two forums to adjudicate first the marriage and then the support
when she is the one who left the state to obtain a divorce. 66 The
Dackman court indicated that one of the bases for its ruling was the
fact that the wife was never personally before the Nevada court.67
Thus, when read together, Dackman and Staub seem to say that a
wife who chooses a "quickie" divorce forum in which the court is precluded from awarding alimony because of lack of personal jurisdiction
over the husband will be forever barred from obtaining alimony."
One last factor mentioned by the Dackman court as persuading
it that the exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate was that the
63. 354 U.S. at 418.

64. 170 Md. 202, 183 A2d 605 (1936).
65. Id. at 212, 183 A.2d at 610. See also Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1378, 1414 (1953).
66. See Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal. 2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959); McCoy v.
McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N.W. 377 (1921). In Paulson, Support Rights and an
Out-of-State Divorce, 38 MINN. L. Rgv. 709, 727 (1954), Staub is said to represent
the application of "waiver" on the part of the wife if she chooses to institute out-ofstate divorce proceedings. It is argued that this application "requires a wife entitled
to a divorce (presumably because of some misconduct of the husband) to choose
between (1) the maintenance of rights of support together with a distressing marriage
relationship, or (2) a divorce with consequent loss of support." Id. at 727. This
argument seems weakened, however, since if the wife is faced with such a situation
and the husband is the guilty party, she can always sue for divorce and alimony in
the home state (assuming she can obtain jurisdiction over the husband). If the
husband's offense is not recognized in the home state as a ground for divorce a
Maryland court may well argue that although they must recognize the foreign decree
they should not have to award alimony for a divorce the ground of which Maryland
does not recognize. See also Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 H.Av. L. Rpv. 1287, 1301
(1951). There is also a choice of law problem when a wife obtains a foreign ex parte
divorce. Should the court apply Maryland law, the law of the divorcing forum, the
law of husband's present residence, or the law of the matrimonial domicile? The
latter would seem to be the simplest and the fairest. See Note, State Law Problems
in Adopting the Divisible Divorce Theory, 12 STAN. L. Rzv. 848, 853 (1960).
67. 252 Md. at 346, 250 A.2d at 68.
68. But see Portnoy v. Portnoy, 401 P.2d 249 (Nev. 1965).
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husband had "ample" property in Maryland. 9 Should a Dackman
situation arise again, with the modification that all but a negligible
amount of the husband's property had been transferred out of the
state, would the court refuse to apply the Dackman modification? It
is submitted that this question should be answered in the negative.
The existence of property owned by the husband within the forum
state should only be important as to whether the court has jurisdiction
in the wife's action for alimony.7" If the husband is no longer domiciled
in Maryland, and the wife has not impeached the jurisdiction of the
divorce rendering state, there is no in personam jurisdiction over the
husband. Assuming the husband keeps himself out of Maryland, the
only other basis of jurisdiction is in rem jurisdiction based on the
presence within Maryland of property belonging to the husband. The
amount of this property should be of no consequence (other than that
the judgment is a charge only on the property); Maryland has an
interest in protecting the rights of its domiciliaries, and the presence
of property within Maryland is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to
enforce those rights. 7'
CONCLUSION

The court of appeals' holding in Dackman represents an exception
to the unitary theory of divorce which had previously been rigorously
adhered to by the Maryland court. The court carefully chose its
language and expressly stated that the opinion was to be limited to
the fact situation presented. When so read, the exception carved out
by Dackman is so narrow as to leave the previous law practically
unscathed. It is difficult to perceive whether the court's language is
an expression that the factual situation in Dackman is the point beyond
which the principle cannot be bent or whether the narrow holding is a
renewed plea for legislative action which had heretofore fallen on deaf
ears. In light of the fact that the issue was raised by the court and
not the parties, the latter assertion may well be correct.
In either event, there is no compelling reason that either the
court or the legislature cannot go beyond Dackman. The Supreme
Court long ago decided in Estin that support rights in the state of
the marital domicile can survive a valid ex parte divorce decree in
another jurisdiction. Such survival has been permitted in numerous
states by either court decision or statute. Perhaps the easiest solution
69. 252 Md. at 346, 250 A.2d at 68.
70. See text accompanying note 9 supra. In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
416, 417 (1957), the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe New York court did not have
personal jurisdiction over him, but in order to satisfy his obligations, if any, to Mrs.
Vanderbilt, it sequestered his property within the State." (footnotes omitted). The
court also stated the general rule to be that ". . . a court cannot adjudicate a personal
claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." Id.
In a footnote to this statement, however, the Court states that ". . . [i]f a defendant
has property in a State it can adjudicate his obligations, but only to the extent of his
interest in that property." Id. n.6 (footnotes omitted).
71. If the Maryland court could obtain personal jurisdiction of the husband, the

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 9C U.L.A. §§ 1-33 (1957), would

permit an in personam judgment against the husband to be enforced in the state where
the husband relocated. A form of the Act is in force in Maryland, MD. ANN. CODZ
art. 89c, §§ 1-39 (1969) and Nevada, NEv. Rzv. STAT. ch. 130 (1955).
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to the problem would be a statutory enactment specifying in which
situations support rights could survive an ex parte divorce.

In reaching its decision, the Dackman court pointed to several
factors which justified a departure from the general rule: the marital
domicile was in Maryland, the deserted wife continued to reside in
Maryland, the adulterous conduct occurred in Maryland, the husband
had ample property in Maryland, and the Nevada decree was rendered
without the wife being personally before the court. The presence of
these factors in order to permit survival of support rights is not mandated by any Supreme Court decision. In fact, the court in Estin was
clear that the states were free to act in this area as they chose. The
court would be free in the future to discard any of these factors that it
chooses. Should the legislature fail to act, an erosion of the factors
relied on in Dackman would not be surprising. Though the precise
holding in Dackman is extremely narrow it is suggested that it is a
catalysis which will, either by legislative action or court decision,
precipitate a further change in the unitary theory of divorce in Maryland. The extent of this change will only be known with the passage
of time.

